
Ebola outbreak caused by the Bundibugyo virus
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Last updated: July 8, 2026
Context
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) officially declared an Ebola disease outbreak on 15 May in Ituri province, in the country’s northeast. On 17 May, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a public health emergency of international concern. The next day, the Africa CDC declared a Public Health Emergency of Continental Security (PHECS).
Unlike most previous Ebola disease outbreaks that occurred in the DRC, this one is caused by Bundibugyo virus. "Ebola disease" is a disease caused by any virus from the Orthoebolavirus family. The most known viruses within this are Ebola virus, Sudan virus, and the Bundibugyo virus.
In the two previous known outbreaks of Bundibugyo virus disease, the case fatality rate was lower than outbreaks caused by the more common and deadly Ebola virus (between 25 to 40%). Yet, responding to this virus is particularly challenging because are currently no approved vaccines or treatments available, unlike for the more common Ebola virus.
At this stage, diagnostics for this virus still rely on complex testing methods undertaken in laboratories with stringent biosafety. In June 2026, a few hundred Bundibugyo-specific test kits arrived in the country, but many communities, especially those affected by ongoing insecurity, still have limited access to them. While research and development are ongoing, expanding decentralized testing will take time and effort to establish. In parallel, different organizations launched a clinical trial in early July to identify the first effective treatments for the Ebola disease due to the Bundibugyo virus. Sponsored by WHO, the PARTNERS clinical trial has been coordinated by the Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) in the DRC, the Institute of Tropical Medicine in Belgium and the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom – in collaboration with international research, clinical and humanitarian partners including MSF, and supported by the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC).
The outbreak was first identified following alerts of an unusual increase in deaths linked to a suspected viral haemorrhagic fever in Mongwalu health zone, northwest of Bunia, the capital of Ituri Province. In collaboration with the Ministry of Health (MoH), MSF assessments conducted in affected areas found dozens of deaths had occurred since April, with suspected and confirmed cases also reported in Bunia and Rwampara health zones. Over the next few days, the outbreak spread far further in the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu, and most recently (21 May) South Kivu.
Several neighbouring countries have introduced travel restrictions in response to the Ebola disease outbreak. Since the closure of Goma airport, access to parts of eastern DRC has often relied on flights into Kigali followed by overland travel, considering that Rwanda has put in place measures that affect transit through its territory. Humanitarian staff wishing to return to the DRC via Kigali must have stayed outside the DRC for more than 30 days. Travelling through eastern DRC is also challenging due to the conflict - with different front lines and areas of control having their own movement restrictions, check points and insecurity. Uganda has also introduced border restrictions, but exemptions are in place for authorized Ebola response teams, humanitarian operations, food and cargo transportation, and security personal under strict health screening and monitoring protocols.
While humanitarian and medical personnel, as well as essential medical supplies, are generally exempt from these measures, these restrictions have created additional logistical challenges. They make it more difficult, costly and time-consuming to move emergency teams and essential supplies into areas affected by the outbreak. This is particularly challenging in eastern DRC, where humanitarian access was already constrained by insecurity, poor infrastructure, and the remoteness of many communities.
Additionally, on 24 June, the Congolese authorities issued a decree requiring all individuals arriving from an Ebola-affected province undergo a 21-day observation period within the country before undertaking any national or international travel.
This is the 17th Ebola disease outbreak in DRC. This is the third detected outbreak involving the Bundibugyo virus, following outbreaks in Uganda in 2007-2008 and in DRC in 2012. The Bundibugyo virus was first identified in 2007 in Bundibugyo district in western Uganda, during which 131 cases were reported with 42 deaths. MSF has been an active partner in many Ebola responses, including the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa. We also have experience with Ebola caused by Bundibugyo virus, having responded to outbreaks in 2007 and 2012.
Some figures:
Democratic Republic of the Congo:
Based on the official data from INRB toll there are 1,708 confirmed cases, 580 confirmed deaths and 280 survivors as of 06 July. You can refer to the following for updated numbers link.
More than 1400 MSF staff are responding to this Ebola disease outbreak in DRC
In the first weeks following the declaration of the outbreak, MSF sent teams and tens of thousands of items to strengthen the response capacity. Several tonnes of medical and logistical supplies continue to arrive in the DRC each week from MSF’s international logistics hubs.
Since the beginning of MSF’s response until 03 July, 843 patients were admitted in MSF’s Ebola Treatment Centres in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu, including 357 confirmed Ebola-cases, and 116 survivors. More than 90% of these patients were admitted in Mongbwalu and Bunia ETCs.
MSF currently has a capacity of more than 430 beds within its ETCs and isolation units put in place across Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu Provinces.
Uganda:
As of June 24, 20 cases had been confirmed. You can consult this link for updated figures.
The response, led by the Congolese Ministry of Health and supported by several international partners, is expanding but still falls far short of what is needed as the outbreak keeps spreading to new areas. As cases are now being confirmed in new health zones, including imported ones in Tshopo and Haut-Uele provinces, people urgently need a response that matches the scale and speed of the crisis they are facing.
Despite the recent scale up in efforts, we are still seeing critical gaps in response capacity, including in surveillance, testing, community engagement and rapid case detection. These gaps must be urgently addressed by all stakeholders involved in the response to save lives and avoid further transmission, especially as cases are now being confirmed in new, remote health zones where there is little or no support. A centralised approach in urban settings will be insufficient to contain the outbreak – support also needs to reach remote communities wherever new cases are emerging.
The outbreak is currently centered in Ituri, with the main epicenter around Bunia, Mongbwalu, Rwampara and Nyankunde health zones. However, other areas – outside of urban ones – show either none or little support by humanitarian actors for the provision of Ebola care. As the outbreak keeps spreading to new areas, MSF may be soon reaching its maximum capacity. This evolving epidemiological situation, coupled with people’s reticence to seek Ebola care far from their homes, means Ebola care must be decentralized outside of main urban centers.
Among the challenges, the lack of timely access to diagnostic capacity remains critical despite recent improvements. At the same time, access constraints, including conflict-related insecurity, airport closures, flight restrictions and suspensions, are disrupting staff rotation, diagnostics, referrals and supply chains. We know from experience that border access restrictions measures severely hinder outbreak response, and isolate countries that urgently need international support. They also increase the use of unofficial and unmonitored crossings, further complicating surveillance and containment efforts. All authorities, de facto authorities, parties to the conflict, and stakeholders involved in the response must facilitate humanitarian and medical access across borders and conflict lines, including for staff, patients, medical evacuations, laboratory samples, referrals and essential supplies. Airport closures, blocked supply routes, border closures or restrictions across areas under different control must not prevent continuity of healthcare or Ebola response activities. These restrictive measures create critical risks for community engagement, access to Ebola care, outbreak control and the continuity of other essential healthcare services.
Every aspect of the response must be rooted in continuous engagement with communities — listening to concerns, addressing fear and misinformation, and building trust so that people feel safe seeking care. The response cannot succeed if it is imposed on communities rather than built with them.
MSF's Response
MSF's Ebola disease outbreak response is structured around the following pillars, adjusting our operations to the epidemiological situation in Ituri, North and South Kivu.
Treatment and Care
In areas where suspected or confirmed Ebola cases have been reported, MSF is setting up and operating Ebola Treatment Centres (ETCs) to provide specialized care and contain the spread of the disease.
In areas affected by the outbreak, as well as in locations where MSF already supports health services and ongoing activities:
- Isolation and Triage
Our teams are establishing isolation units and triage systems within health facilities to ensure safe patient flow, support the early detection and isolation of suspected Ebola cases, and enable the safe continuation of other essential healthcare services. In several locations out teams also support the Health Authorities with the safe transportation of Ebola patients.
Prevention & maintenance of “non-Ebola care”
MSF is reinforcing infection prevention and control (IPC) measures in many health facilities by providing training to healthcare workers on infection prevention and control (IPC) measures, the management of suspected Ebola cases and on the safe provision of other essential services, such as maternity care, malnutrition treatment, and trauma care in an Ebola context.
As part of prevention efforts, MSF is also conducting community engagement and health promotion activities to raise awareness about Ebola, including its symptoms, transmission, prevention measures, reporting mechanisms, and where to seek care.
- Surveillance and Detection
Our teams are working closely with community leaders and local health authorities to strengthen surveillance and early detection systems. This includes engaging community leaders to report unusual health events, establishing toll-free alert lines where they do not already exist, and strengthening reporting mechanisms within health facilities to ensure timely identification and notification of suspected cases.
Strengthening Response Capacity
In the first two weeks following the declaration of the outbreak alone, MSF sent tens of thousands of items to strengthen the response capacity. This includes Ebola kits containing medicines, disinfectants, and hygiene materials, as well as personal protective equipment (PPE) such as gloves, masks, goggles, gowns, and protective boots to help ensure the safety of healthcare workers. Several tonnes of medical and logistical supplies continue to be deployed across the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Several tonnes of medical and logistical supplies continue to arrive in the DRC each week from MSF’s international logistics hubs.
Human Resources Support
MSF is deploying and recruiting medical and logistical staff to reinforce response capacity in affected areas.
Continuity of Essential Healthcare Services
MSF continues to maintain ongoing healthcare activities while simultaneously responding to other health emergencies and disease outbreaks in the country, including cholera and measles, which were already affecting communities prior to the Ebola outbreak.
Map of our operations
As of June 22, 2026

MSF Regular Activities in DRC:
MSF has been working in DRC since 1977. In 2025, MSF ran 17 regular projects and responded to 53 emergencies, with a total budget of €131 million.
MSF provides a wide range of medical services, including primary healthcare, surgery, paediatric and maternal care, and treatment for survivors of sexual violence. Preventing and responding to infectious diseases and epidemics also remains a major focus, alongside care for HIV and malaria, and improving access to healthcare for people living with disabilities.
A key priority for MSF is addressing both the direct and indirect consequences of violence on civilians, particularly in eastern DRC, through medical care, water and sanitation services in displacement sites, and distribution of essential relief items.
MSF teams also respond to emergencies linked to natural disasters.
